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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BENTLEY WILSON, ' 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ) 
BRENDA HALTON WILSON, ) 
Respondent/Appellee. ) 
) Case No. 20070359-CA 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE FACT THAT THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
BASED UPON STIPULATION DOES NOT NULLIFY THE TRIAL 
COURT'S OBLIGATION TO MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING 
THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS. 
Appellant contends that the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree did not carry over the determination of child support and alimony 
established in the temporary order. In support of his position, Appellant first contends 
that to adopt Appellee's position that the alimony and child support award contained m 
the temporary order was carried over into the Amended Decree is tantamount to 
upholding a legally deficient determination of alimony and child support lacking (he 
requisite findings of fact on the statutorily defined factors. 
A. Appellee does not Dispute that the Amended Findings are 
Devoid of the Required Factual Findings. 
1 
A review of the Amended Findings of Fact reveals that there is not a single finding 
of fact that is relevant to the determination of child support and alimony. (R. 347-370; 
Addendum, Exhibit "D") Explicitly, there is not a single finding as to the Appellant or 
Appellee's current or historical gross and net income. There is not a single finding as to 
either's ability to earn or their respective needs. There is not a single reference to the 
child support guidelines. 
In the responsive brief filed by the Appellee, she does not dispute the total absence 
of any relevant findings in the Amended Findings of Fact and relies only on the contents 
of the temporary order that recites the representation of Appellant that he had a gross 
monthly income at the time of the temporary order of $10,000 and a statement that the 
Appellee contended that she was currently unemployed. (R. 98-101) There is no question 
that in the Amended Findings, the court does not even convert those representations mto 
factual findings. Further, there is not a shred of documentation or even a signed affidavit 
attesting to those representations. 
B. Appellee Does not Dispute the Requirements of the Relevant 
Statutes Regarding Findings of Fact for the Determination of 
Child Support and Alimony. 
Importantly, the Appellee does not contest the assertion made by the Appellant 
that Utah statutes require a trial court to make specific findings in sanctioning a child 
support or alimony award. 
1. Findings Requirements for a Child Support Award 
2 
U.C.A. 78-45-7(2) and (3) (1998 as Amended) provides: 
(2) If no prior court order exists, a substantial change in circumstances has 
occurred, or a petition to modify an order under Subsection 78-45-7.2(6) 
has been filed, the court determining the amount of prospective support 
shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but 
not limited to: (a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; (b) the 
relative wealth and income of the parties; (c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; (e) the ability of an incapacitated adult 
child to earn, or other benefits received by the adult child or on the adult 
child's behalf including Supplemental Security Income; (f) the needs of the 
obligee, the obligor, and the child; (g) the ages of the parties; and (h) the 
responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in 
this chapter. 
There is no question that the "[fjailure of the trial court to make findings on all 
material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are ' clear, uncontroverted, 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.' " Acton v. J.B. 
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983)). In addition, "[t]he findings 'should be sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' " Id. (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979)). See also, Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988) (U.C.A. 78-45-7 
3 
requires the trial court to consider at least the seven factors listed therein). 
2. Findings Requirements for an Alimony Award 
U.C.A. 30-3-5(8) (2006 as Amended) provides: 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the 
recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of 
the payor spouse to provide support; (iv) the length of the marriage; (v) 
whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and (vii) whether the recipient spouse directly 
contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for 
education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to 
attend school during the marriage. . . . 
The Court in Olsen v. Olsen, 586 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. 2007) (quoting 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985)) and Sill v. Sill, 164 P.3d 173 (Utah 
App. 2007, Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a) held that the trial court consider "at least" 
certain named factors, including, in part: cc(i) the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; [and] 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-
(iii) (Supp.2007); sec also Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (Utah App. 1999) (In determining 
the amount of alimony, "a trial court must consider the needs of the recipient spouse; the 
earning capacity of the recipient spouse; [and] the ability of the obligor spouse to provide 
support."). The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
4 
reached." Andrus v. Andrus, 169 P3d 764 (Utah App. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "A trial court's failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error when the 
facts are not clear from the record." Id. 
C. The Fact that the Amended Findings and Decree were Based 
upon Stipulation does not Nullify the Trial Court's Duty to Make 
the Required Findings. 
Appellee, in Point I of her brief alleges that the fact that the Amended Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree were based upon stipulation eliminates the duty of the trial court 
to make the required factual findings on the required elements for establishing a level oi 
child support and alimony (Appellee's Brief at 9). However, the Appellee fails to cite 
even a single case or legal authority in support of her contention. 
Contrary to the assertion of the Appellee, Utah law is clear that the presence of a 
stipulation does not affect the trial court's obligation of make the required factual 
findings. The content of U.C.A. 78B-12-201 (2008 as Amended) is clear: 
(1) In any matter [stipulated or adjudicated] in which child support is 
ordered, the moving party shall submit: (a) a completed child support 
worksheet; (b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78B-I2-
203(5); (c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child 
support requested is consistent with the guidelines; and (d) the information 
required under Subsection (3). 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not 
available, a verified representation of the other party's income by the 
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted, (b) 
The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after a copy 
has been provided to the other party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in an 
administrative proceeding. , . 
5 
(4) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and 
alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support 
amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support award 
required by the guidelines. 
Id. 
Importantly, as provided in subpart (4), the presence of a stipulation does not 
relieve the parties of providing all the required financial information and documentation, 
it only is appropriate if it meets or exceeds the guidelines. 
Further, Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, amplifies the requirements 
accompanying the requirement for the filing of the required child support worksheets. 
(a) When filing a child support worksheet required by Utah Code Section 
78-45-73, a party shall: (a)(1) file the worksheet in duplicate and the clerk 
of court shall send one copy to the Administrative Office of the Courts; or 
(a)(2) file one worksheet with the court, send the information on the 
worksheet electronically to the Administrative Office and so indicate on the 
worksheet, (b) The court shall not enter the final decree of divorce, final 
order of modification, or final decree of paternity until the completed 
worksheet is filed. (Emphasis added) 
There can be no question that the statutes outlining the requirements for an 
alimony and child support award arc not conditioned on whether the award is adjudicated 
or stipulated. The statute requires definitive findings. The statutes relating to the 
required components of any final order of child support or alimony, work sheets, etc., do 
not differentiate between stipulated amounts and tliosc determined by the court. The 
logic behind the Appellant's position is clear. The trial court has a duty to ensure that any 
order, stipulated to or not, meets the purposes and requirements of the relevant statute. 
6 
In matters relating to child support, the Coun has adjudicated thai the child support award 
does not belong to the custodial parent, rather, it belongs to the child. ("The right to 
support from the parents belongs to the minor children and is not subject to being bartered 
away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the 
parents."/////.? ^ Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981)). Accordingly, the court has a special 
obligation to ensure that any stipulation is based upon established facts required by the 
worksheet and that it meets the requirements of the guidelines, Finally, to aid the 
determination of any subsequent contention of th parties that the circumstances of the 
parties have changed requiring a modification of an award, the court has to have a valid 
verifiable basis for the prior order. 
As it relates explicitly to the rights of a court to question a stipulation of the 
parties, the Court's determination mAndrus v. Andrus, 169 P.3d 754 (lit. Ct. App. 2007), 
is instructive. In that case, the husband challenged the trial court's decision to adhere to 
Paragraph 6 in the Stipulation, which precluded consideration of wife's income in 
calculating Husband's child support payments. The Court held first that right to support 
from the parents belonged to the minor children and cannot be subject to being bartered 
away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the 
parents." Id., citing Hills v. Hills, 638 P.2d 516, 517 (Utah 1981) and .Galley v. Gulley, 
570 P.2d 127, 128-29 (Utah 1977). The Court then held that the trial court's decision to 
apply Paragraph 6, even after the other provisions dealing with alimony and child support 
7 
were invalidated, was an abuse of discretion because it allowed the wife to avoid her 
statutory and inalienable common law duty to provide financial support to her children. 
Id. 
In this case, without any findings or information related to the parties' current 
gross and net income, ability to earn, needs, and other relevant facts, the trial court could 
not determine if either or both of the parties were fulfilling their statutory duty. 
The case law is clear that the parties may not so stipulate to deprive the trial court 
of jurisdiction and its statutory obligation. In Sill v. Sill, 164 P.3d 415 (Utah App. 2007), 
the Court considered the enforceability of a non-modification clause1 and determined that 
the non-modification clause, even if incorporated into a decree does not divest the trial 
court of its statutory continuing jurisdiction. Id. Generally, the Utah appellate courts have 
held that na parties' stipulation as to property rights in a divorce action, although advisory 
and usually followed unless the court finds it to be unfair or unreasonable, is not 
necessarily binding on the trial court.1' Cohnan v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 
1987). Thus, a trial court clearly can refuse to enforce an agreement of the parties. Id. 
As it specifically relates to alimony in this case, all the information that the trial 
court has was a representation of the Petitioner's gross income and a representation that 
i 
The subject settlement agreement included a stipulation specifying that "[t]he 
provisions of th[e] [Ajgreement shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of 
Divorce which implements it with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not 
been disclosed and divided in th[e] [Ajgreement, those maybe brought back before 
the [c]ourt for appropriate disposition." Id 
8 
the Respondent was not working at the time. There was no information as to the 
Petitioner's net income and his needs and no information on the ability of the Respondent 
to work, her historical income and her needs. Utah's case law is clear that a 
determination of alimony based only on gross income is reversible error. In Andrus. the 
husband made the argument that the trial court abused its discretion by calculating his 
alimony obligations based on his gross monthly income instead of his net income. 
The Court held that in determining alimony, a trial court must consider, along with 
other factors not under attack in the instant appeal, "the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support." Id. The Court held that the trial court's "'findings of fact must show that 
the court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. 
The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."' 
Id. Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. 
Deliran, 731 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The 
Court continued that a trial court's failure to provide adequate findings is reversible error 
when the facts are not clear from the record. See id. at 1334-35 (vacating an alimony 
award and remanding for adequate findings). 
In applying the law to the facts of the case, the Court held in Andrus, 
Here, the trial court arrived at its alimony award by awarding Wife half of 
Husband's monthly disposable income. The trial court determined 
Husband's disposable income by subtracting certain expenses, including 
housing, food, transportation, and child support, from Husband's stipulated 
9 
gross monthly income. The findings of fact are silent on the issue of 
Husband's tax obligations and monthly net income. Even though there is 
some evidence in the record concerning the amount of taxes Husband pays, 
including testimony by Wife and documentary evidence provided by 
Husband, we cannot ascertain how or if the trial court contemplated 
Husband's duty to pay taxes in calculating his disposable income. The trial 
court's findings of fact are not sufficiently detailed to show the steps it took 
determining Husband's disposable income. We therefore reverse and 
remand for adequate findings thai will show proper consideration of 
Husband's net income. (Emphasis added) 
Id. 
POINT II: THE DISPUTED PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDED FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND DECREE ARE AMBIGUOUS AND SHOULD BE 
CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES. 
The Appellant contends that the disputed language in the Amended Findings is 
ambiguous. The relevant language is as follows: 
8. The Petitioner has requested a reduction in both child support, which 
has previously been ordered in the amount of $2,100-00 per month, and 
alimony which has been ordered in the amount of $4,000.00 per month. 
The issue of whether or not a reduction should be granted shall be reserved 
for a period of six months so that each party is able to obtain further 
information regarding the Petitioner's actual income. 
9. The Petitioner was awarded the physical custody of the minor children 
during the months of August and September. Therefore, ths issue of the 
amount of Petitioner's actual child support obligation for August 2004 and 
September 2004 is reserved for final determination by the Court. 
10. All other issues are reserved. 
16. All other issues not resolved herein are reserved for further hearing by 
the trial court. (Emphasis added) 
(R. 347-370: Addendum, Exhibit "D") 
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The Appellant contends that the highlighted language set our above was intended 
to mean that the Petitioner had requested a modification to reduce the amount of child 
support and alimony that had been oideied during the period from the entr} oi the 
temporary order to the date of the Amended Findings, Conclusions and Decree. It 
was a modification only of the temporary alimony and child support levels that were 
intended to be affected by paragiaph 8 If the Appellant did nothing dunng the specified 
six month period of time, only his light to seek a modification of the support dunng the 
period from the entry of the temporary order to the Amended Deciee would be affectea 
Appellant contends that the level of piospcctive alimony and child support, commencing 
with the entry of the Amended Decree, were never intended to be affected by Paragraph 8 
or was the paragraph to be construed as incorporating the terms of the temporary order 
Rather, the level of permanent support and alimony were issues included m paragraph 16, 
as mattcis that the parties resen ed 
It is respectfully submitted that if the above cited provision is read fairly, a 
reasonable person would conclude that IT could be interpreted as Appellant contends. One 
could also argue that the interpretation uiged by the Respondent and found by the 5ov\ei 
court could also be extiacted from leading the relevant provisions cited above 
Importantly however, the actions of the parties upon the entry of the Amended 
Decree constitute the best pi oof of what the parties intended If the Respondent really 
believed that the alimony and child support levels from the temporary order were 
intended to carry over into the Amended Decree, there would have been no reason to 
11 
conduct discovery related to the income and expenses of the parties. However, the 
Record reflects that the Respondent/Appellee was sending discovery requests in August, 
2005, long after the expiration of the six-month period. (R. 445) In fact, on August 19, 
2005, the Respondent filed eleven (11) subpoenas duces tecum addressed to the 
Appellant's employers, banks and other sourced from which the information required to 
assess alimony and child support could be obtained. (R. 379-444) 
The Pretrial Conference held on December 8, 2005, primarily dealt with the 
demands of each of the parties regarding discovery. Respondent actually obtained an 
Order detailing the Appellant/Petitioner's obligation to supply requested information on 
January 9, 2006. (R. 471-473) Ongoing discovery was discussed in the Pretrial 
Conference of January 31, 2006. (R. 474) The Petitioner/Appellant was conducting 
discovery on the income and expenses of the Respondent in January, 2006 (R. 475-80). 
Importantly, the only issue that could possible have been referred to in the 
Amended Findings' reservation of issues, was the assessment of child support and 
alimony. There were no other financial or other issues existing at the time of the 
Amended Decree. 
The law is clear that the courts interpret a divorce decree according to established 
rules of contract interpretation."' Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431 (Utah App. 1999)(quoting 
Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). As long as the language of 
the decree is not ambiguous, the court looks to its plain language to determine its effect. 
12 
See Dixon \ Pro Image lnc , 987 P 2d 48 (Utah 1999) ("If the contract is written and the 
language employed is not ambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain 
meaning of the language ") 
However, language m a wiitten document is ambiguous if its terms ma\ he 
understood to suppoit two oi moie plausible meanings Whitehousc \ Whitehomc 790 
P 2d 57(Utah Ct App 1990) If the language of a judgment is obscure or ambiguous, the 
nilcs that apply to the construction of ambiguous contiacts apply Lucfo Seven Rodeo 
Coip v Clark, 755 P 2d 750, 753 (Utah Ct App 1988) The cardinal rule of 
interpretation is to give effect to the parties' intentions Heiner v SJ. Groves & Sons Co , 
790 P 2d 107 (Ltah Ct App 1990) Therefore, e\tnnsic eudence as to the parties' 
intention may be lecencd and considered. Lucky Seven Rodeo Coip 755 P.2d at 753, 
and nthe entire record may be resorted to foi the purpose of construing the judgmentH 
Park Citv Utah Corp \ Ensign Co , 586 P 2d 446, 450 (Ltah 1978) 
In summary, the thieshold question of whether or not a wilting is ambiguous is a 
question of lavv for a court to decide Faulknei i Famsworth 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 
1983), Property Assistance Corp v Roberts, 768 P 2d 976, 977 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
This initial determination does not require resort to extrinsic evidence Zions First Mat'l 
Bank v National Am Title Ins Co, 749 P 2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988), Seashores lnc v 
Hancey, 738 P 2d 645, 647 (Utah Ct App 1987) Language m a written document is 
ambiguous if the uoids used may be understood to support two or moie plausible 
13 
meanings. Property Assistance Corp., 768 P.2d at 977. A court is justified m determining 
that a contract or order is ambiguous if its terms are either unclear or missing. Faulkner, 
665 P,2d at 1293. When a judgment is "obscure or ambiguous, the entire record may be 
resorted to for the purpose of construing the judgment." Park City Utah Corp. \\ Ensign 
Co., 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978); accord Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 
1980). The court must then adopt a construction '"which will make the judgment more 
reasonable, effective, conclusive, and . . . which brings the judgment into harmony with 
the facts and the law.1" Park City, 586 P.2d at 450 (quoting Moon Lake Water Users Ass'n 
v. Hanson, 535 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1975)). In resolving an ambiguity, it is appropriate 
to consider both the context in which the document applies and the "purpose which was 
sought to be accomplished." Progressive Acquisition, 806 P.2d at 244. Furthermore, 
because "the cardinal rule of interpretation is to give effect to the parties' intentions," 
Williams v. Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah App. 1990), when a divorce decree is 
ambiguous "extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intention may be received and 
considered." Id. 
It is respectfully submitted that the relevant language is in fact, ambiguous and thai 
the Appellant is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's older in this matter foj a hearing 
as to the parties' intent or more logically, based upon the partem of conduct of the parties 
of conducting discovery relevant to child support and alimony, a ruling adopting the 
Appellant's position on the basis that it is the only position that is consistent with the 
14 
subsequent actions of the parties and the statutory duty of the court to enter the icquired 
findings of fact 
POINT 10: RESPONDENT DOES NOT DISPUTE THE LAW RELATING TO 
THE INTERPRETATION OF TEMPORARY ORDERS. 
Important to the disposition of this matter, the Respondent does not contest the 
basic law regarding the interpretation of temporary orders. There is no question that 
payments that become due and payable under a temporary order may be reduced to 
judgment after the entry of the final decree. Druce v. Druce 738 P.2d 633 (Utah 1987). 
Importantly, "[wjhen a temporary order is followed by a permanent order, the temporary 
order merges into the permanent order.5' See Birch Creek Irrigation v. Piothero, 885 
P.2d 990,994, (Utah 1993) and also Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307 (Lt. Ct. App. 2001). 
The long accepted doctrines relating to the enforceability of temporary orders and 
their status upon entry of a final order are consistent only with the Appellant's position 
that Paragraph 8 related only to the modification of the temporary order during the period 
before the entry of the Amended Decree and that the establishment of prospective 
support and alimony were reserved pending the discovery by the parties. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the law and the facts of this case, Appellant requests an order 
reversing the distnct court's detennination and adjudging that the Temporary Order of 
August 11. 2004. terminated on the entry of the Decree of Divorce, October 7, 2004. 
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Appellant requests that the matter be remanded for a hearing on child support and 
alimony levels and arrearages, if any, to be effective with the entry of the Decree, 
October 7, 2004. 
Dated this^Z day of April, 201)8-
^C 
fOSEMOND G. BLAKELOCK, ESQ 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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